Abstract

This article examines current high levels of violent conflict in Plateau State in central
Nigeria using an economic property-rights analysis that draws on the work of Harold
Demsetz, Robert Cooter, Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney.
The thesis of the article is that this wide-spread violent conflict over resource use/access
is tied, in important ways, to the passage of federal legislation in Nigeria that nationalized
land. This legislation, I contend, blocked the continued evolution of customary land-law
norms that had evolved to meet a variety of land-use needs and that had a relatively lowcost and transparent indigenous dispute resolution mechanism.
The new institutional environment is beset by problems associated with very high levels
of official corruption that make enforcing the law difficult. More importantly though, the
legislation itself blocks the evolution of land law so that outright sale (which was
occurring under customary law) is now prohibited. This change means that individuals
are forced to rely on corrupt government officials to allocate an increasingly scarce
resource. Because the official channels for allocation are perceived as corrupt and
because the government often does not enforce property rights, individuals might be
resorting to costly private enforcement in a desperate effort to gains rights over valuable
land.
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Blocking Legal Evolution and Paying the Price:
Property and Conflict in the Nigerian Highlands
Karol C. Boudreaux*
Introduction

“The fundamental purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplishment, is
that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic resources. Welldefined and well-protected property rights replace competition by violence with
competition by peaceful means.”1

Three years: 53,000 people dead; thousands of homes destroyed; tens of thousands of
men, women, and children displaced.2 These terrible statistics are not the toll taken in a
traditional war between nations. Nor are they the results of a civil war. Rather, these
grim figures represent the outcome of a particular kind of conflict that surfaces all-too
often in Africa and throughout the developing world: a bloody battle over the use and
control of resources, a battle that ultimately is about property rights.

Between 2001 and 2004, the people of the central Nigerian state of Plateau suffered a
series of deadly riots that led to the declaration of a state of emergency.3 What caused
these riots? A peace conference conducted by the government blames the violence on
*Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. I would like to thank the following
individuals for their helpful comments: Paul Dragos Aligica, Peter Boettke, Donald Boudreaux, Brian
Hooks, John Paden, Russell Roberts, and Frederic Sautet. My thanks also to the participants of the
Mercatus Center’s Graduate Workshop and also to Josh Hill for helpful research assistance. Responsibility
for errors is mine alone.
1
Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html.
2
Nigeria – Plateau State Violence Claimed 53,000 Lives – Report, IRIN NEWS.ORG, Friday, October 8,
2004 available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43580.
3
The state of emergency is now ended. For the text of the Declaration see,
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/FedGovt/Federalism/emergency_rule/plateau_obasanjo.html. For
reporting on the event. See Nigeria: Obasanjo declares state of emergency in Plateau State, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040518-irin02.htm.
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disputes over property -- disputes that were, undoubtedly,exacerbated by ethnic and
religious conflicts.4 The scope of this killing is shocking and leads one to ask, “What
has happened in Nigeria to drive people to settle land disputes by means of violence
rather than by use of peaceful judicial, administrative, or customary mechanisms?”

This paper considers possible answers to these difficult questions, focusing on two issues:
the evolution of legal norms in response to both endogenous and exogenous changes, and
the role that African customary law and indigenous dispute resolution played in
promoting coordination and cooperation among group members, and thereby reducing
violent conflict. The paper considers whether the continued evolution of relatively elastic
customary legal norms was impeded by legislative action of the federal government of
Nigeria. Property norms under customary law were flexible enough to provide a wide
variety of property rights and allow for the peaceful trading and reasonable protection of
those rights, allat relatively low cost . In addition, accessible indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms provided access to leaders with substantial local knowledge of
property rights arrangements. Further, the paper examines one element of the customary
land law – rules for dealing with strangers – and considers how these provisions reduced
transactions costs and aligned expectations about property norms.

Formal de jure rules governing property law were changed in 1978 by a federal statute
that imposes a costlier, less flexible formalized and centralized approach to land-use
issues. This paper suggests that legislation, coupled with significant enforcement
problems, might be responsible for some of the violence in Plateau.
4

Examining ways in

Nigeria – Plateau State Violence, supra note 2.
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which the property-right environment has changed may provide insight into the sources
of the violence plaguing the Nigerian highlands in Plateau State.5

The Outlines of the Crisis

Consider Yelwa. On May 2nd, 2004 in this small town in Plateau State, a group of
Christian Taroks, carrying guns and machetes, attacked and murdered over 600 Fulani
Muslims.6 The attack was meant to avenge a Fulani massacre of 50 Taroks that had
taken place inside a church in February 2004, which, in turn, was a reprisal for earlier
attacks by Christians of Fulanis. The attacks devastated the town and the region. One
reporter noted that: “Churches and mosques were razed. Neighbor turned against
neighbor. Reprisal attacks spread until finally, in mid-May, the government imposed
emergency rule.”7 While ethnic and religious conflicts partially explain the vicious
confrontations, at heart, this massacre seems to have been about land. New York Times
reporter Somini Sengupta wrote:

“Before there were mass graves here, there was the matter of cows and corn
patches. Some years ago . . . farmers accused cattle herders of deliberately
sending their long-horned beasts to trample across their plots. Cattle herders
accused farmers of deliberately setting their grassy meadows on fire to keep their
animals from grazing.”

5

The official motto of Plateau state is the “Home of Peace and Tourism.” See Thatcher’s Website available
at: http://www.thachers.org/Oct%202001%20files/oct_2001.htm. This personal web site, run by an
American doctor and missionary in Nigieria, also shows photos of the aftermath of the Jos riots.
6
Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in Plateau State, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, available at
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/11/nigeri8568_txt.htm.
7
Somini Sengupta, Letter from Africa; Where the Land Is a Tinderbox, the Killing Is a Frenzy, NEW YORK
TIMES, June 16, 2004.
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Other observers agree. Human Rights Watch characterized the massacre as “a prolonged
conflict over land use as well as political and economic control.”8 Discussing the
conflict in Yelwa, Alex Vines of the Royal Institute of African Affairs argued that it was,
at heart, a contest over land.9 Sengupta observed: “In recent years, as the desert has
spread, trees have been felled and the populations of both herders and farmers have
soared, the competition for land has only intensified.”10 Mark Doyle of the BBC echoed
this insight:

While there is great wealth at the top of Nigerian society . . .there is also great
poverty and some of the violence reflects a struggle for resources and survival.
This is particularly the case in rural areas along a belt of territory across the centre
of the country, including Plateau State, where farmers are in competition for land
and resources with herders. In areas where farmers are predominantly settled
Christians and where cattle herders, originally from further north, are mainly
Muslim, an impression can be created of 'religious' or 'ethnic' tension. But in
reality the root causes of the violence are political and economic - a competition
for fertile land.11

If the inhabitants of Yelwa, and of Plateau state more generally, are competing for a
scarce resource – land -- in an increasingly heterogeneous environment, 12 economic

8

Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed, supra note 6.
Sengupta, supra note 7.
10
Id. For a discussion of the relationship between property rights and migratory herding, see TOM
BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH, 239-242 (1998).
11
Mark Doyle, Poverty behind Nigeria’s violence, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, May 19, 2004 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3730109.stm. The same sentiment is found in a report by EDC News:
“`It is more a matter of the natives fearing their land was being taken over and deciding to fight for it,’ says
one local expert. The Sahara Desert is steadily advancing southwards, forcing many farming and grazing
communities in the Nigeria’s [sic] far-north to move south in search of greener pastures. Their arrival in
central Nigeria has increased pressure on the land. Many indigenous communities in the Middle Belt have
been afraid that they will lose out to the newcomers.” See, Conflict in northern Nigeria more about land
and livelihoods than religion, EDC NEWS, ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES, Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency available at
http://www.edcnews.se/Cases/NigeriaYelwa2004.html.
12
“ The population in northern Nigeria grew from approximately 16.8 million in 1952 (the date of a reliable
census taken by the British) to approximately 47.3 million in 1991 (the date of the last reliable census by
the independent government). This growth represents an annual increase of 2.61% per annum, though in
9
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theory predicts that they would seek to create and enforce more individualized rights to
land in order to internalize externalities caused by these changes. They would seek these
rights in order to allocate the resource more efficiently and to restrict entry to better
capture the increasing value of land.13 Unfortunately, the legislative solution to land-use
and land-allocation issues in today’s Nigeria -- the Land Use Act of 197814 -- creates a
rigid legal environment that limits internalization efforts byprohibit ing the sale of land,
restricting permissible lot sizes, and requiring government permission to lend or lease
property.15 Such rigidity contrasts with the relatively elastic customary law in Plateau,
which provided a rich array of mechanisms to manage changes in market value and
technology – including even the sale of land.16

some regions, such as Plateau State and Niger State increases have been more substantial – 3.5% in Plateau
per annum and 3.12% in Niger. Sustained droughts in the far northeast of Nigeria are partially responsible
for the increase of population in the more humid areas of Plateau and Niger.” See Werner Fricke, Factors
Governing the Regional Populations Development in NE-Nigeria, in PERSISTENCE AND TRANSFORMATION
BETWEEN CHAD BASIN AND BENUE 13, available at http://www.rzuser.uniheidelberg.de/~bu1/sfb/d1/Session_fricke_www_ symp99_2.html. The Annual Abstract of Statistics of
Nigeria lists the 1991 population of Plateau state at 3,312,412. The projected population for 1998 was
4,627,043. See ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Office of
Statistics, Table 12 at 26 and Table 13 at 27 (1999).
13
In his seminal work, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Harold Demsetz argues: “[P]roperty rights
develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization. Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values. . . changes
to which old property rights are poorly attuned.” 57 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, No. 2, 350 (May,
1967). He goes on to discuss the ways in which Montagnes Indians developed property rights in hunting
grounds in response to increases in the value of fur-bearing animals. Id. at 351-354. See also, Eirik G.
Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, Issue 4, 1141 (Dec. 1972), and Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill,
The Evolution of Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, 126 (2003).
14
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Decree #6, Land Use Act (Lagos, 1978). Shortly before the Land Use Act
was implemented in 1978, 34,656.1hectare of land in the Benue/Plateau state was “purchased,” which is
defined as “bought for cash” by official Nigerian government documentation. In 1967 Benue and Plateau
were merged, they have since been separated. See, RURAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, Report on Land Tenure
Equiries, 1976/1977 – 1978/79, Federal Office of Statistics, Agricultural Survey Unit, Lagos, June, 1989 at
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. In 1977/78 this number had, for Plateau alone, fallen to 7,602 and in 1978/79 the
number was 243 or 0.12 percent of the land in Plateau state. The Land Use Act prohibits such sales.
15
Land Use Act, supra note 14 at § ____.
16
Discussing the customary land law of Papua New Guinea, Robert Cooter writes: “[M]y general view (is)
that customary law is living law, which changes and develops according to the wishes of the people who
are subject to it.” Robert Cooter, ISSUES IN CUSTOMARY LAND LAW, 4 (Institute of National Affairs 1989)
available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/. The customary land law of Nigeria changed as well,
responding to differing needs and constraints. See discussion infra, at 36 to 45
.
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Complicating this situation is the Nigerian government’s inability, or unwillingness, to
effectively mediate conflicts: “In the latest incident, police and army reinforcements
were only sent to Yelwa after hundreds of people had already been killed.”17 President
Obasanjo, in his Declaration of May 18th, 2004 stated:

As at [sic] today, there is nothing on ground and no evidence whatsoever to show
that the State Governor has the interest, desire, commitment, credibility and
capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony
and stability. If anything, some of his utterances, his lackadaisical attitude and
seeming uneven-handedness over the salient and contending issues present him as
not just part of the problem, but also as an instigator and a threat to peace. Plateau
State cannot and must not experience another spate of violence, killings and
destruction of property. If allowed, the crisis will engulf the entire nation.18
In situations where resources are highly valued and where the number of competitors for
the resource is both large and heterogeneous, it is normally assumed that formal
governance structures are needed both to define and enforce rights.19 In the case of
property disputes in Nigeria’s highlands, however, formal governance structures designed
to manage such disputes are corrupt, costly and/or non-existent.20

17

Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed, supra note 6; see also Nigeria: Jos – A City Torn Apart, available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nigeria/nigeria1201-02.htm#P107_10073. There is evidence that
government officials knew in March that reprisals on the citizens of Yelwa where planned in response to
the February killings. Despite assurances that the government would “deal decisively” with the any
plotters, little was actually done to prevent the bloodshed. See, Nigeria: 2,500 displaced in Plateau State
violence, says Red Cross, available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/60dd46cd396516f285256e4d0076eb95?.
18
Declaration of Emergency Rule in Plateau State of Nigeria, available at
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/FedGovt/Federalism/emergency_rule/plateau_obasanjo.html
19
Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT,
AND LAW, 145 (Princeton University Press 2003) who notes that in such a situation, “the power of the state
usually is necessary to supplement informal constraints on access and use.” In Nigeria, the state fails to
provide such supplemental support.
20
In 2004, Nigeria placed next to last in a score of perception of corruption within the state. See Nigeria
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003 225 (2004) available at
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/11_Country_reports_L_Z.pdf
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This corruption and costliness traps the people of Plateau state between the proverbial
rock and hard place. If land values in Plateau are rising due to increased demand, this
should lead to a gradual movement away from the traditional communal propertyregime ,
towards greater individualization of tenure.21 However, the Land Use Act blocks this
evolutionary move by prohibiting land sales and by encumbering other permitted
transfers with significant bureaucratic obstacles.22

This legislatively imposed me thod

for allocating land is widely believed to be corrupt.23 The new system replaces evolved
indigenous dispute resolutions mechanisms with a costlier bureaucratized disputeresolution system. And finally, as President Obasanjo claims, the process for enforcing
these new property rights often simply fails to function. Thus, the people of Plateau may
be left to take “justice” into their own hands, as the federal government imposes an illfitting legislative solution on land-tenure issues that the state government fails to enforce,
resulting in an anarchical environment.24

21

Demsetz, supra note 13 at 350. In situations where property values increase, competition for control of
the resource often increases. For discussions of increased conflict over land as a result of increases in
value see, Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap and Bernardo Mueller, TITLES, CONFLICT AND LAND USE,
(1999), who discuss episodes of violence in the Brazilian rain forest in response increasing demand for
land; see also, Gershon Feder and David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and
Implications for Development Policy, 5 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, No. 1, 138-39 (January,
1991), discussing the conflict levels in Thailand in the late 19th century in response to rising land value.
22
Changes in the value of land in Plateau state, and the desire of individuals to capture this increased value,
may be leading people to band together to better block entry by non-group members. If there is strength in
numbers, dissatisfaction with the current land system in Plateau state may be causing people to group
together to fight off threats to their property claims. This destructive collective action may represent a
response to an unproductive de jure system and an attempt to adjust the de facto property rights in the
absence of effective government action. See Gary D. Libecap, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16
(1989) who says: “For example, an increase in relative prices or a fall in production costs will raise the
stream of rents attainable from ownership and encourage new competition for control. Old enforcement
mechanisms may no longer be adequate, leading to rent dissipation as inputs are diverted from production
to protect against trespass and theft. . . Capturing a portion of any rents that can be saved by more
precisely defining property rights motivates individuals to organize for collective action to adjust property
institutions from their current state to the new conditions.”
23
See discussion infra at 47-52.
24
For an economic analysis of the decision-making process involved in determining when to negotiate
property rights claims and when to fight over conflicting claims see generally Terry L. Anderson and Fred
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Unfortunately, Yelwais not an isolated incident. Major riots occurred in the northern
Plateau city of Jos in 2001.25 In 2002, Fulanis attacked Tarok people in Wase in southern
Plateau, in March, 2003 another Tarok settlement was attacked resulting in over 80
deaths, and in June 2003, over 500 people were killed.26 Reprisals followed the Yelwa
massacre.27 The Jos riots, while attributed to discontent over a political appointment,
were likely exacerbated by insecure property rights, which made it difficult to effectively
absorb large numbers of internally displaced Nigerians. Human Rights Watch notes:

many people fleeing conflicts in their own areas had sought protection and safety
in Jos; some had even settled there. Some observers believe that this regular
influx of populations from neighboring states may have ended up destabilizing the
tranquility of Jos. People fleeing in 2000 and 2001 from clashes in Kaduna,
Bauchi, Taraba, and Nasarawa states may have inadvertently contributed to
creating an atmosphere of fear among inhabitants of Plateau State by testifying to
the atrocities they had left behind, some of which were still continuing. The
increase in the population in Jos, in particular, also created an increase in
economic pressures, leading in turn to the scarcity of some goods and increase in
prices. Resources became stretched, and tensions began to rise.28

Since 1999, a number of other northern and middle belt states in Nigeria have
experienced repeated episodes of violence.29 Violence escalated following the election of

S. McChesney Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations 37 JOURNAL OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 39-74 (1994).
25
See Nigeria: Jos - A City Torn Apart, supra note 17. See also, 20 dead in fresh Plateau violence despite
state of emergency, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040520irin02.htm
26
Plateau State: Communal Conflicts in Wase (Southern Plateau) and Berom area (Northern Plateau)
IDASA, SPECIAL TOPIC, WEEKELY UPDATE available at:
http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D193%26TID%3D11%26OTID%3
D2.
27
See 20 dead in fresh Plateau violence, supra note 24.
28
See, Nigeria: Jos – A City Torn Apart, supra note 17.
29
See, Nigeria, 2,500 displaced in Plateau State violence, supra note 17. The 1980s and 1990s have been
described as particularly repressive in Nigeria. See, Abdul-Ganiyu Garba and P. Kassey Garba Open
Conflicts when State, Institution and Market fail: The case of Nigeria 37 unpublished manuscript available
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the civilian government of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, and particularly after the
reintroduction of sharia law in criminal cases in 12 northern Nigeria states, beginning in
2000.30 During the intervening years, thousands have been killed and, as noted, in 2004
President Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in the Plateau state.31

These conflicts are typicallycharacterized as struggles between ethnic and religious
factions.32 Nigeria is extraordinarily diverse, composed of over 250 ethnic groups.33
Plateau State alone has 54 different ethnic groups.34 Some of these groups have conflicts
related to political rivalries, some related to religious differences, and some related to
access to resources. The Yelwa massacre is an example of the latter.35

from Department of Economics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria and on file with author. The
recent rise in the incidence of violence may be tied to the election of a civilian leader. Under a military
dictatorship, discord and attendant violence might be more effectively suppressed, whereas under civilian
rule it might prove more difficult to suppress discord and violent conflict. Nigeria elected President
Obasanjo in 1999. The country was ruled by military dictators from 1983 to 1999.
30
Sharia, or Islamic, criminal law was introduced in the northern state of Zamfara in January, 2000. Sharia
had been outlawed after Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Since its reintroduction in 2000, 12 states have
adopted sharia. See, John Paden, Islam and Democratic Federalism in Nigeria, AFRICA NOTES, No. 8,
March, 2002, p. 1, Center for Strategic and International Studies. In Nigeria, sharia is applied is applied to
Muslims only in both civil and criminal cases. However, actions of vigilante groups, who “watch” for
sharia violations, have resulted in non-Muslims to feel increasingly intimidated and, in some cases, in
attacks against non-Muslims. See Nigeria’s Sharia Split, BBC NEWS, October 15, 2001 available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1600804.stm.
31
David Cowan (ed.) Nigeria Country Report, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 7 (August, 2004),
available at www.eiu.com. Subscription service.
32
See Gilbert Da Costa, Resurgence in violence kills hundreds in Nigeria, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
PORTSMOUTH HERALD, August 23, 1999 available at
http://www.seacoastonline.com/1999news/8_23_w2.htm.
33
See Nigeria, CIA—THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html.
34
See, Funmi Peter Omale, Implementation Committee for Peace Confab Inaugurated, THIS DAY (Lagos),
Friday, October 8, 2004 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200410080379.html.
35
Nigeria: Muslim death toll in raid on Yelwa tops 600 – Red Cross, IRINNEWS.ORG available at
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?/ReportID=40952&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectC May 7, 2004. See
also Tom Ashby, More than 100 Dead, 1,000 Wounded in Nigeria Feud, REUTERS NEWS, Friday, April
30, 2004 available at http:www.reuters.com/newsArticle.
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The country is not only divided along ethnic lines, it is also divided along religious lines:
approximately 50% of the population is Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% adhere to
indigenous animist beliefs.36

Of the 36 states in the Nigerian federation, the 19 northern

states are predominately Muslim, while the 17 southern states are predominately
Christian.37

The heterogeneity of Nigerian society makes for a potentially explosive mix. Since its
independence from British colonial rule in 1960, political power in Nigeria has shifted
back and forth between representatives of different ethnic, regional, and religious groups,
in an effort both to stem regional rivalries and to spread the benefits that flow from
political leadership.38

Despite efforts to dampen regional and ethnic tensions, the mix of ethnicities and
religions has exploded into violence from time to time, the most seriously during the
Biafran civil war in the late 1960s. To this day, conflict remains a significant problem,
36

CIA Factbook, supra note 32.
See, Paden, supra note 29 at fn. 1.
38
At the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria was divided into three regions: the North, dominated by
Hausa & Fulani ethnic groups, the West, dominated by Yorubas, and the East, dominated by Igbos. See,
TOYIN FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 10-11 (1999). Over the past 44 years, Nigeria has been led by a
northerner, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was killed in a coup led by southeastern Igbos, who in turn
were overthrown in a counter-coup led by Yakubu Gowon, a northerner from Middle Belt, which
precipitated the three-year long Biafran civil war. The Gowon government broke the three regions of
Nigeria into 12 to dampen regional tensions. This government lasted until 1975 when it was overthrown by
Murtala Muhammed another northerner who, along with Olesgun Obasanjo a Yoruba Christian, ruled until
Muhammed was assassinated and Obsanjo took over. Obsanjo, a military officer, voluntarily turned power
over to a northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. In 1983, a military coup displaced Shagari with
Muhammad Buhari, which was overthrown in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babaginda and Suni Abacha.
Babaginda ruled until 1993, when elections were held. Chief M.K.O. Abiola a Yoruba from the south won
these elections, which were annulled by Babaginda, who then transferred power to an short-lived interim
government, which was replaced by rule by Abacha. Abacha died in 1998. Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian,
was elected in 1999. On the problems associated with power sharing and the marginalization of ethnic
groups in Nigeria, see Tunde Babawale, The Rise of Ethnic Militias, Delegitimisation of the State, and the
Threat to Nigerian Federalism, 3 WEST AFRICA REVIEW, available at http://westafricareview.com/war/
vol3.1/babawale.html.
37
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as certain groups within Nigeria fear domination by others and often perceive those in
charge as corrupt.39 Discontent has led to repeated demands for a change in leadership –
or, often, to a violent coup to replace a leader perceived as illegitimate or biased with
someone more considered more trustworthy. However, while increasing ethnic and
religious polarization among Nigerians drives much of the nation’s violence, the
underlying issue that often grounds this violence is property and land-tenure disputes.

This paper attempts to identify a possible connection between the current Nigerian
property-rights regime and riots that have left thousands dead. The focus is on Plateau
state for a number of reasons. First, Plateau is unique among the northern Nigerian states
in that the hold of the Islamic Sokoto Caliphate was fairly tenuous in the region.40
Indigenous customary norms may have lasted longer in Plateau than in many other
regions of northern Nigeria. This means that those norms continued to develop and
modify throughout the 19th century, rather than being replaced by “foreign” Maliki rules
and customs.41 Even under British rule, significant deference was shown to customary
normsand traditions in Plateau state. The British “hands off” policy of indirect rule
meant that indigenous norms regarding land tenure and dispute resolution were largely
protected and enforced by the colonial-era Native Court system.42 Finally, I focus on
Plateau because there is clear recognition, in international media outlets, that some of the

39

KARL MAIER, THIS HOUSE HAS FALLEN: MIDNIGHT IN NIGERIA, 11-19 (2000).
British colonial official Lord Hailey writes: “The Fulani system of rule did not, however, extend
throughout Northern Nigeria; on the Bauchi plateau and south of the Benue River there were large areas
where `pagan’ tribes had never fully acquiesced in it. Though it would have been convenient to treat those
areas as falling within the Fulani system, this was not thought to be justified.” LORD HAILEY, AN AFRICAN
SURVEY REVISED 1956, 454 (1957).
41
ROBERT MCC. NETTING, HILL FARMERS OF NIGERIA, 46-47 (1968).
42
Id. at 48-51.
40
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violence in Plateau is tied to disputes over access to, and control of land.43 For these
reasons, Plateau presents a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of centralized
government action (nationalization legislation) -- coupled with problems of corruption
and increasing heterogeneity -- on the spontaneous evolution of customary land tenure
and property-rights norms.

The Property Environment: Property in Land and Land Tenure in Nigeria

Before 1978, there were three primary sources of property law in Nigeria: customary
law, English common and statutory law, and post-colonial legislation. As of 1978, land
law in Nigeria is based exclusively on a federal statute that has been incorporated into the
Nigerian Constitution: The Land Use Act of 1978.44

Customary Land Law

Traditionally, the belief was that property in land in Nigeria belonged to God, but was
held communally, in a community-based tenure system.45 Under this system, the first

43

See discussion supra, pages 2-4.
Land Use Act, supra note 14.
45
See N.O. Adedipe, J.E. Olawoye, E.S. Olarinde & A.Y. Okediran, Rural communal tenure regimes and
private landownership in western Nigeria, LAND REFORM BULLETIN: 1997/2, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) available at
http://www.fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LR972/w6738t13.htm, and Nigeria: Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure,
Sec. 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES ,available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?cstdy:1:./temp/~frd_5Hy0::. Note, however, that in an older treatise on African customary
law, ICJ Justice T.O. Elias argues that it is incorrect to conceive of the African land tenure system as
communal. Rather, it is more appropriate, he argues, to consider it as corporate. See, T.O. Elias, THE
NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW, 164. (1956).
44
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person to clear and use unclaimed land would establish possession and use rights.46 This
first possessor would allocate land to heads of families, based on need.47 Over time, the
first possessor’s role would be taken on by a headman or traditional chief, who would
allocate property to family heads. These family heads would allocate land for use by
their family members.48

Among the duties of the chief were: to manage community land reserves, to maintain
group customs concerning land use, to ensure that the rights of the group were not
diminished, and to see that the rights of group members and, as appropriate, the rights of
strangers, were respected. The chief held residuary, reversionary rights to theproperty as
a trustee, on behalf of the group, never as an absolute owner.49 These duties provided the
chief with income (often in the form of in-kind payments of agricultural products and/or
with cash payments for serving as an arbiter of disputes) along with significant social
status, as well as political control over the group.50
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See Adedipe, et al, supra note 44.
These rights may be perpetual or for a period of time. See Emea Arua and Eugene Okorji,
Multidimensional analysis of land tenure systems in eastern Nigeria, LAND REFORM BULLETIN: 1997/2
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) available at
http://www.fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LR972/w6728t14.htm. Also, rights for the temporary use of land could be
granted to other groups. An example would be granting the right to herders to allow their animals to graze
the stubble in a field that has been harvested. See Ouedraogo & Toulmin, Tenure Rights and Sustainable
Development in Western Africa: A Regional Overview, Feb. 1999, at 2, available at:
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/liveihoods/landrights/africa_west.htm.
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The chief, usually along with appropriate elders, had primary responsibility for managing
the indigenous dispute resolution process concerning land-use rights.51 In some groups,
permanent tribunals existed, with identifiable judicial officers, whose job it was to bring
offenders before the tribunal and thereby help preserve social order.52 Land disputes
were an important part of the case work of such tribunals. Cases involving land might
address boundary disputes, disputes over the length of time one party was permitted to
borrow or lease land, or rights of a party to occupy land in perpetuity if it seemed the land
had been gifted away.53

When a dispute among members of the same family lineage arose, the aggrieved party
would call for a meeting of the family or village headman and his advisors to resolve the
issue.54 The headman and/or elders would request that the aggrieved party state his or her
case. The accused party would also be asked to state what he or she knew about the
dispute. This oral evidence relied, obviously, on the memories of disputants, family
members, and witnesses to transactions. The headman, along with elders, would crossexamine witnesses and then consult among themselves in order to reach at a decision.55

These norms created a kind of informal property registry, or recording office. Reliance
on memories requires disputants and adjudicators to draw heavily from the bank of
51

For an interesting discussion of dispute resolution among the Tiv, an ethnic group located near, but not
in, Plateau state see PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV, 30-31 (1989). While
chiefs and elders often met in a kind of judicial session, disputes might also be taken directly to a chief for
resolution. See also Elias, supra note 44 at 238-243 for a description of the way in which a civil case was
conducted.
52
Elias, supra note 44 at 218-19.
53
See Bohannan, supra note 50 at 60 and GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 114.
54
See Elias, supra note 44 at 217-222. Elias notes that disputes over land were considered “great” subject
matter and so would often be resolved in the chief’s court, under more formal rules of procedure.
55
Bohannan, supra note 50 at 28-69.
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dispersed local knowledge.56 This process, which requires people to proclaim openly, or
“publish,” what they know and to swear to the truthfulness of their statements, is one
possible way to reduce information asymmetries – thereby reducing the costs of
transacting.57 Relatively transparent communications of this sort may also decrease
levels of uncertainty within a community. On the other hand, there are clear drawbacks
to reliance on memory. However, in an isolated area with a small and compact
population, such an approach may have been cost effective, compared with more formal,
and costly, specification of rights.58

In cases of disputes between families or villages, the headman or sub-chief would
approach a headman or sub-chief of a third group. This third party would attempt to
resolve the dispute if both parties to the dispute agreed.59 If they refused to submit to the
third-party adjudication, this would be reported to the tribe’s main chief.60 If the case
warranted it, this head chief would be called on to hear and resolve the dispute. In cases
of disputes between tribes, emissaries would be sent by the aggrieved tribe to thetribe
allegedly causing the harm, asking for redress. In some cases, appeal was made directly
to a third tribe to act as mediator.61
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See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 4,
519-530 (1945).
57
Note that such publication becomes costly in high-risk environments where officials, or others, can seize
resources with relative impunity. See Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19
). See also, Feder and Feeny,
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION, at 410 and 412-13 (2003
supra note 21 at 140.
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Even in less hierarchical societies, those in which political power was dispersed, civil
disputes were handled in a similar manner: namely, by resort to an elder who would hear
a dispute, then appeal to a more influential elder, or, if a case was especially important, it
would be taken to an ad hoc council of elders of the family lines in the local
community.62 A variety of other methods for initiating the resolution phase existed.63
Paul Bohannan notes that land disputes were quite common, though he doesn’t comment
on the frequency with which they led to violence.64

Family members had possession rights and rights to use land located in the family’s
territory. In other words, land was jointly owned on a kinship basis.65 Under the
customary tenure system, women normally could neither own nor inherit property,
though their husbands typically “gave” them some land to work each year.66
Traditionally, women had usufructory rights over certain land as long as they lived with
their husband’s family.67
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Id. at 220.
These included announcing a dispute by beating drum throughout a village, which works to call elders
together, the party seeking redress might go to a group of spiritual elders, whose jurisdiction might be
broader than that of village elders, a spear might be place before an accused party’s home, signifying the
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suits. Id. at 220-21.
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An individual was required to use land to benefit the family or community group.68 So
long as an individual was making beneficial use of land he could keep the property, pass
it on to his heirs, and even pledge its use in satisfaction of a debt.69 Individuals, as well
as families, had rights to exclude both strangers and, in certain situations, family
members. However, non-family members (strangers) could, if given permission by the
headman or chief, use land in the territory of the community of which he became a
member – a pointto which I will return to.70 Further, groups and individuals could lend
land. Indeed, so long as land was available, the group or individual holding the unused
land could not refuse to lend to one who asked, though increasing scarcity has placed
strains on the lending system.71

Generally, individuals were not able to sell or mortgage property.72 However, a near
equivalent of sale could be created by pledging land and never redeeming it.73
Furthermore, there is evidence that in areas where significant labor was expended
developing land for farming, a system approaching individualized tenure existed.74
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Cooter discusses one of the key roles played by a communal property system: “Customary land law
creates an incentive structure for cooperation and coordination among kin in the production and distribution
of goods. The incentive structure includes a network of mutual obligations, which restricts everyone’s
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Fabiyi, Economic implications of property rights on smallholder use of fertilizer in southwest Nigeria,
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Individuals were unable to acquire property by adverse possession.75 However,
individuals had full rights of ownership in physical structures they added to real property,
as well as to plants/trees they added.76 The customary idea of rights to land did not,
apparently, include the rights to items found on the land that someone else placed there.
This fact means that one family could have use rights to the soil, and another family, who
had planted nut trees on the land, could have rights protect, maintain, and use the nuts.
Under customary norms, the legal idea of land was limited to the soil. Finally, it was
only the family or the community, acting under the direction of family and/or community
leaders, who could dispose of property.

Towns and villages could also hold land. These lands typically included grazing and
hunting lands, market sites, and such areas as sacred groves.77 Today, corporate bodies,
known as corporate aggregates, still hold land under communal tenure.78 Some lands
were “attached” to particular offices, or positions: obas in the south and emirs in the
north. Legal interests in these lands were absolute rights. Over time, the role of theobas
and emirs with regards to land has diminished and these traditional leaders have lost
some of their prestige and power.79
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Much land in Nigeria is still held based on customary rights. However, both population
and the demand for land have increased. 80 As a result, land available for use and
development is becoming scarcer. Studies from the mid-20th century report limited
availability of land in some areas and the sale of land in certain districts. 81 After
Nigerian independence in 1960 land sales continued, furthering a move away from
communal ownership and towards increased private ownership.82 In order to sell land
under the customary law, the family member wishing to sell must receive the consent of
all principal members of the family. For the transaction to be valid consideration must
be paid, and the seller must provide evidence of the “handing over” of possession in the
presence of witnesses.83 Once families, or communities, begin to partition family or
communal land this is a signal that customary tenure rights are ending. However, in some
areas, purchase of land remains difficult.84

The ability of families and communities to hold land based on customary rights was
modified by the 1978 Land Use Decree, which vests ownership of allland in the
government “to be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all
Nigerians.”85 The Act apparently attempts to create a British-style land-tenure system in
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Education to Nomadic Fulani in Nigeria, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (ODI), Pastoral
Development Network, Agricultural Administration Unit available at www.odi.org/uk/pdn/papers/20d.pdf.
See also Bamire and Fabiyi, supra note 69 at 3 who note that increased reliance on cash crops such as
cocoa, oil palm, cola nut and coffee, in conjunction with technologies that increase agricultural production,
making agricultural land more valuable are also leading to increased individual ownership.
83
Adedipe, et. al., supra note 44.
84
Arua & Okorji, supra note 46.
85
Land Use Decree, supra note 14, § 1.

21

which the crown/sovereign holds ultimate title to land, but allows for long-term leasing of
property.86 Land-administration functions were taken from chiefs, family heads, local
communities and transferred to administrative agencies. Issues involving the sale, lease
or inheritance of land were, according to the law, to be managed by these agencies, which
operate under the office of the state governors.87

Previous forms of title were replaced by “certificates of occupancy,” which are issued by
either state officials (in the case of urban land) or local government officials (in the case
of most rural land).88 These officials have the power to revoke customary rights if land is
needed for a public purpose.

In addition to this change in the legal environment, exogenous factors are causing
changes in the customary tenure system. As noted above, increases in population are a
problem, as are migrations resulting from the increased desertification of northern
Nigeria, and increasing urbanization, all of which increases pressure on land use in
northern and middle belt Nigeria.89 These pressures may lead to a desire among
inhabitants for increased individualization of tenure and away from the restrictive Land
Use Act regime and the traditional communal property tenure system.90

86

Cite to British land law -Donald C. Williams, Measuring the Impact of Land Reform Policy in Nigeria, 30 JOURNAL OF MODERN
AFRICAN STUDIES, 589 (Dec., 1992).
88
Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 16.
89
Sengupta, supra note 7.
90
Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 5. Lord Hailey recognized similar pressures in Nigeria in the
mid 20th century when he noted that “The principal effect of economic development (in Nigeria) has been
seen in the increasing tendency to delimit individual holdings, both in Muslinm and pagan areas.” Hailey,
supra note 39 at 789.
87

22

Property Norms in Northern Nigeria

Until the early 19th century, northern Nigeria was largely controlled by the Hausas – the
main ethnic group in northern Nigeria. The Hausas maintained a customary land-tenure
system until the first decade of the 19th century. During the very early 19th century,
Muslim Fulanis, led by Usman dan Fodio, extended their control over a significant
portion of northern Nigeria, creating the Sokoto Caliphate.91 As they did, they instituted
changes in land-tenure rules. The new Fulani rulers took control of Hausa lands and
vested ownership rights over these lands in the Sultan of Sokoto.92 Land held by the
Sultan was divided into reserve lands, which was “state” property to be used by the
Sultanate; cultivated lands, for which imams determined the use allocations; unused
lands, also under the control of imams, and finally, waqf lands, to be used for the benefit
of the entire community.93 This system provided extensive control over land to imams,
who would grant use rights and who would also, at times, assign unused land without
reference to needs of the local community.94

However, while Plateau state is part of northern Nigeria, it was subject to only limited
Fulani control – primarily on the periphery of the region.95 Most of the inhabitants of the
interior of Plateau were free from the Fulani conquest,96 and so, Fulani institutions did
not take root there. The Fulani were unable to exercise extensive control over Plateau
91
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because its rugged terrain, coupled with the fiercely independent nature of its inhabitants,
made both military conquest and subsequent administration too costly.97 The Plateau
region provided a refuge for people escaping a variety of potential overlords.98

Even in the 19th century, Plateau was highly heterogeneous, and was composed of many
small ethnic groups who lived independently from one another, but who engaged in some
trade.99 The various tribes that inhabited Plateau moved there in order to escape threats
posed by slave-raiding expeditions from the coastal regions and from the Islamic north.
Another motive was their search for available land.100 In the 19th century, the people of
Plateau were primarily animists and had a less developed, less hierarchical political and
social structure than did the Hausa/Fulanis.101

After the British took control of Nigeria in 1900, they created different governing
structures in the North and South: the Protectorate of North Nigeria and the Protectorate
of South Nigeria. 102 As is true to this day, southern Nigeria was richer than the north and
had a stronger tradition of autonomy. However, as the North had a well developed
administrative structure and was governed by what the British viewed as a “respectful”
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and conservative leadership, they adopted a “hands-off” approach to the north.103 The
British institution of indirect rule largely left the Muslim leadership in place. 104 It also
respected the sharia law of the north as well as the customary laws of the area.105

The British arrived in Plateau region in 1904, in response to requests by the Niger
Company, which faced hostile inhabitants and repeatedly closed trading routes.106 For
reasons similar to those faced by the Fulani, the British were unable to subdue the
inhabitants of the area in the early years of their rule.107 It took repeated use of armed
force to quell uprisings and inter-ethnic violence. When the inhabitants were, finally,
brought under control, the British created a somewhat different governance structure for
Plateau; not based on rule by emirs, but based on a high degree of self-rule at the local
level.108 Discussing the British approach to rule in Nigeria, Lord Hailey says:
The distinctive concepts which have determined the use of that system [Native
Authority] are shortly as follows. It has in the first place avoided as far as
possible the employment of any local authority which has not held a recognized
position of influence derived from indigenous custom or tradition. Second, it has
contemplated that the entities so employed (whether they have been Chiefs,
Chiefs in Council, Councils of Headmen, or groups of Elders) should rely mainly
on the authority they derive from indigenous custom when giving their aid in the
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furtherance of schemes of social or economic welfare promoted by the
Administration.109

The Native Authority system gave chiefs and elders primarily responsibility for the
functioning of local government; they were particularly important in the creation and
functioning of Native Courts. 110 As decision makers in this new dispute resolution
process, local leaders would have continued to bring their deep local knowledge to bear
on conflict resolution. Indeed if, as one critic argues, the British purposefully kept
formally trained lawyers out of the Native Courts, then it seems likely that the indigenous
dispute resolution norms developed under customary law prevailed in Native Courts.111

In Plateau, the British attempted to create a tribunal for each tribe and even for sub-tribal
units. Some large tribes had more than one court. The members of the courts acted as an
advisory council for the Executive Chief, who served as President of the court. The
British also created seven “Alkalai” Courts, for use by non-indigenous, Muslim
inhabitants of Plateau.112

When Plateau was divided into Districts in 1927, each district

was assigned District Heads – both “Pagan” (animist) and Fulani (muslim). Starting in
1930, the “Pagan” Heads began supervising tax collection, including collection of the
cattle tax imposed on the Fulani herdsmen.113 The notion was to move toward more
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extensive indirect rule and allow the local inhabitants greater control of the structures of
governance. A further example of this approach is Lord Hailey’s observation that: “The
scope of rule-making power of Native Authorities was extended in 1945 to embrace the
definition and modification of Native law and custom. In the same year they were also
given special power to deal with matters relating to the tenure of land. . .” 114

Because of the diversity of tribes in Plateau, and differences related to population density,
soil fertility, and abundance or scarcity of land, there were differences among land-tenure
norms. 115 For example, the Gazetteer reports that in the Pankshin Division (eastern
Plateau) among the Angas tribe, a man who cultivated land held tenure similar to
freehold.116 The report notes that farm land was sold, but for a low price (indicating
relative abundance of land at the time). However, land in this area was not leased or
pawned. The practices in Pankshin may be contrasted with those of the Jos Division
(northern Plateau) where land was held in a manner more like a lease in perpetuity.117
Land could be leased to or borrowed by others. Leases tended to be long-term with no
set termination date, but with an annual payment in kind. Sale of land was rare in this
area – except around the town of Ganawuri, where there was valuable fertile land.118 In
the Shendam Division, it seems that inhabitants held many sticks in the bundle of
property rights, but not enough to warrant their tenure being labeled “freehold.” This
114
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land could not be sold and chiefs could dispossess inhabitants for disloyalty or as
punishment for a serious crime such a murder.119 The Gazetteer notes: “Disputes about
the ownership of land are very rare, and when they do occur, they invariably arise out of
a lease or loan.”120

In 1916, the British enacted the Lands and Native Rights Ordinance,121 which created a
peculiar bifurcated approach to land law in Nigeria. In southern Nigeria, most lands
belonged to private citizens – not the government. Some property was held by a “stool”
(a seat of political authority within a communal land-holding ethnic group), other
property by communal or family groups and some by individual ownership.122 Land
ownership and the sale of land were tracked in the south via a registry system.123

A very different system applied to northern Nigeria.124 In the north, the British declared
all land in the former Fulani fiefs to be public property. The fief system was abolished
and ownership over land in northern Nigeria was transferred to the British crown. As
owners of the land, the British government required those on the land to apply for
occupancy permits, though the government routinely recognized customary rights of
occupancy.125 This system placed limits on outsiders’ abilities to move into northern
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areas.126

It also had the effect of creating segregated areas of “strangers,” or, Sabon

Garis. Settlers were those people whose relatives had been in the area longer than “nonindigenes” or “strangers.” Non-indigenes were granted were lesser legal rights than
settlers. This differential access to land, to local government services, and to political
representation created tensions throughout the northern Nigeria – tensions that remain to
this day.

As a part of northern Nigeria, these same rules applied in Plateau state. Yet, because the
British administrators showed significant deference to local customs there, and because
authorities had greater difficulty “reaching” into the hinterlands of Plateau and exerting
control, the actual, de facto impact of the Land and Native Ordinance Act in much of
Plateau might have been muted.127 Instead, it seems that customary norms surrounding
tenure rights, leasing, borrowing, pledging, and even sales of land, continued to develop
alongside more extensive British control in cities such as Jos or in other northern
states.128 The British expanded the legal authority of the Native Authorities to control
the use and disposition of land in 1945.129

This ordinance “[C]onfers on Native

Authorities more extensive powers than they have in any other British dependency. They
may make rules for the control of alienation and mortgaging, for prescribing that
purchase at sale shall be subject to their approval, for regulating the allocation of
‘communal or family land’ and for controlling its use.”130 Thus, just as during the pre126
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colonial era, under British rule local Nigerian authorities exercised extensive legal control
of land resources.

Finally, following independence in 1960 the regional government of Northern Nigeria
enacted the Land Tenure Law. The Land Tenure Law declares:
“(a) . . . the whole of the lands of Northern Nigeria, whether occupied or
unoccupied, are hereby declared to be natives lands. (b) All native lands and all
rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to the
disposition of the Minister and shall be held and administered for the use and
common benefit of the natives, and no title to occupation and use of any such
lands by a non-native shall be valid without the consent of the Minister.”131
It extended the system created by the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1916.
Further, it created formal restrictions for landholding rights by non-northerners.132 Under
the 1962 Land Tenure Law, rights of occupancy could be for an indefinite term, however
such right were often specified, on the “Form of Application” for 99 years on residential
plots, 40 years for non-northern Nigerians on residential plots, and a sliding scale of up to
99 years for industrial plots.133 In northern Nigeria, land was held by occupancy permits
through the 1960s and 70s. In the 1970s, farmers located on the outskirts of cities often
had their permits revoked, and land was taken and redistributed for urban development.
It appears that only minimal compensation was paid for these takings, leading to
additional conflict over land.134 These conflicts, and concerns over the alleged
speculation in land, set the stage for the next major development in the property rights
regime in Plateau state: the Land Use Act of 1978.
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The Land Use Act of 1978

The Land Use Act (LUA) was issued by the military government of Olusegun Obasanjo
on March 29, 1978.135 The law nationalized allland in Nigeria . At the time it went into
effect, this law extinguished all existing rights to use and occupy land – including rights
held by custom.136 Citizens were required to apply to the government for certificates of
occupancy, which are either statutory or customary, in order to make claims on land or,
more significantly, to transfer rights in land. The law transferred primary responsibility
for the management of communal land from the hands of chiefs or emirs to government
officials.137

President Obasanjo stated that one reason for the statute was the “limiting, inhibiting and
divisive nature of land tenure in the country.”138 The statute was designed to curb land
speculation and real estate price increases, to open access to land for both private and
public use, and to promote tenure security.139 The Land Use Act was offered as an
attempt to rationalize a complex set of customary, common law, and statutory provisions
dealing with land in Nigeria, thereby creating a uniform legal environment.
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As noted earlier, the LUA vests control over land in State Governors, who have a
fiduciary responsibility to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the citizens of
Nigeria. In a case from 1989, Makanjuola v. Balogun, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held
that the effect of the LUA is to vest absolute ownership of land in each state in the hands
of the State Governor.140 Under the statute, State Governors may issue certificates of
occupancy for land in both urban and non-urban areas.141 Local government officials
may only issue certificates for customary rights of occupancy in rural areas. State
Governors decide which areas are urban, and which are non-urban, and thus maintain
significant power over land-allocation decisions.

State Governors are aided by Land Use and Allocation Committees that advise them on
land-management issues in urban areas; on issues related to resettlement or to the
revocation of rights based on public need. Land Use and Allocation Committees are the
“courts of first instance” in resolving disputes related to the awarding of certificates and
to the payment of compensation when land is improved or taken for public use.142
Appeals from committees are taken to officials at the Ministry of Justice and then to the
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formal court system.143 Land Allocation and Advisory Committees work with the Local
Governments on similar issues.144

A statutory certificate of occupancy is typically issued for 99 years.145 The certificate
acts as a kind of lease agreement between the government (the lessee) and the certificate
holder (the lessor). Before the right is granted the state determines the amount of “rent”
to be paid by the certificate holder.146 Local governments may grant customary rights of
occupancy only if there are no competing statutory rights. Statutory rights trump
customary rights.147

When a statutory certificate of occupancy is issued the certificate holder receives a set of
rights, including rights to occupy, to use, and to improve property. This bundle is clearly
thinner than that of a fee simple owner under Anglo-American law. For example, the
certificate holder cannot sell, gift, or sublet land without the consent of the State
Governor.148 However, bequests of rights held under statutory and customary certificates
of occupancy are managed by customary-law principles, not by statutory principles.149

Under the customary land-tenure system the chief, oba, headman, or emir all held
significant power.150 In some cases chiefs and emirs abused their powers, allocating land
to favorites, keeping strangers at bay, and requiring payoffs to permit land transactions to
143
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occur.151 During the colonial period, the power that some chiefs and emirs held over
land allocation ebbed as population growth increased the use of private sales of land.152
The Land Use Decree furthered this process, removing from traditional leaders their
power to distribute a valuable resource – land – and of the income they garnered from
land transactions.153 Donald C. Williams argues: “The Land Use Decree . . . was
designed to pose a direct challenge to alternative sources of societal authority by
relegating all private transactions in land to government agencies.”154

The Land Use Act shifts the power to allocate land away from traditional leaders and to
government officials. At the same time, those individuals who held substantial local
knowledge of the land, its traditional allocations and uses, are no longer called on to
make allocation decisions. Individuals who may have little personal knowledge of the
specifics of land holding and land use are instead called upon to decide who has rights to
what. Cutting the link between the local knowledge and allocation/use decisions is
especially problematic in areas where customary law is widespread because customary
law depends upon the memory of local leaders. Written records were limited. Local
leaders would reach decisions based on their intimate knowledge of individuals and their
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needs.155 Government officials are unlikely to have either this intimate knowledge or a
reasonable substitute, given the paucity of written records.

By placing power to allocate land rights in the hands of politicians – state governors –
and, in turn, Land Use Allocation Committees and Land Allocation and Advisory
Committees, the LUA has created a system in which government officials enjoy huge
bargaining power advantages in issuing certificates or allowing a transfer or sale to take
place.156 Quoting an article entitled “Establishing a Business in Nigeria” Williams
observes:
With the arbitrary powers given to the Governor of the state as regards the
issuance of a C of O (certificate of occupancy), and coupled with the ensuring
bureaucratic red-tapism, it is almost easier to pass a camel through a needle’s eye
than to get this certificate. In the case of transfer of land, where the Governor’s
consent is required before such transfer (be it temporary or permanent) can be
effected, the consent is usually withheld until some exorbitant and ridiculous
transfer fee (consent fee) is paid.157
These same government officials can reward favorites with certificates of occupancy.158
Cronies, family members, and politically well-connected individuals have much less
difficulty obtaining certificates than do poorer, unconnected, and less well-educated
citizens of Nigeria.159 In a study of the effects of the Land Use Decree, Peter Koehn
155
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maintains: “State government officials have effectively barred the rural and urban
laboring classes from all types of statutory rights of occupancy.”160

The Land Use Act suffers from other shortcomings. Due to the high level of corruption
in the public sector, individuals have low levels of trust in the Nigerian bureaucracy.161
Because of their suspicion of public officials, many people may avoid seeking
certificates, because they are required to show proof of payment of property taxes for
three preceding years before a certificate will be issued.162 This requirementapparently
leads officials to demand bribes before they declare tax records “clear.”163 Such
corruption obviously increases the costliness of the process.

Further the Land Use Act limits the size of land one may own depending on whether it is
urban or rural and whether one is a farmer or herder.164 Such a one-size-fits-all (or,
almost all) approach to land use ignores the differing abilities of individuals to
successfully manage land. The approach is reminiscent of the American government’s
studies of improprieties suggest that those with wealth and close connections to State Governments are
overwhelmingly beneficiaries of these programmes.” See also, Libecap, supra note 22 at 17 who notes:
“All things equal, those interest groups with greater wealth, size, and homogeneity will have more
resources to influence politicians regarding the assignment of property rights. . .” Plateau state is composed
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groups: Hausa and Fulani in particular.
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approach to western land held by the federal government: parcel out plots of 160 acres –
whether that was an efficient size or not, and force settlers to live within in the constraints
of this arbitrary limit.165 In Nigeria, the effects of the Land Use Act have been
characterized in this way: “The Land Use Act has arguably exacerbated the stress on
land caused by population increase, and increased the risk of long-term soil and
environmental degradation.”166

The Land Use Act extinguishes rights in undeveloped urban land over .5 hectare and
limits the ability of individuals to possess multiple plots of developed land.167 It has been
noted that valuable property is more likely to be registered than less valuable land –
presumably because the perceived benefits of registration exceed the costs of operating
with the system.168

The system for registering land is seen as being inefficient, both because it is subject to
rent seeking and because it is not capable of handling registrations efficiently, due to
personnel shortages, poor training, and lack of equipment.169 Registry offices often lack
maps and other evidence of property boundaries. For these reasons, they may have
difficulty validating evidence that is provided by claimants. Over time, the costs
associated with registering property have risen significantly.170
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The many problems associated with the Land Use Act suggest that de facto property
rights are quite insecure -- unless, perhaps, one has useful political connections. As a
result of these limitations, individuals often skirt thede jure land law:
“The tedious legal and bureaucratic formalities required for allocation of land in
accordance with the Act have resulted in threatening the very survival and
efficacy of the Act. It is thus open knowledge that means of circumventing the
spirit and letter of the Act are being actively sought.”171
As things currently stand in Plateau, a combination of barriers are working jointly to
block the development of a smoothly functioning, legal real-property market. These
myriad problems lead citizens to circumvent the strictures of the Act. Further, the
perceived injustices of the system, coupled with ineffective enforcement by the state, may
lead to a more serious problem – that of citizens taking “justice” into their own hands,
pursuing strategies of violence over strategies of cooperative trading, which was the past
property-rights norm.172

Blocking the Evolution of Property Norms: An Analysis of the Problem

With this background in mind, we can consider some possible answers to the question of
why violent conflict over property is plaguing Plateau state. As we have seen, a number

Fajemirokun, supra note 135 at 5 observes: “It is also noteworthy that the transaction costs for obtaining
certificates of occupancy have become important sources of government revenues.”
171
Adedipe, et. al., supra note 44 at 10. An example of “skirting” is the following: “Those who do choose
to register any sale often take advantage of prevailing inadequacies in the administrative process. After
payment is made for a plot of land, it is quite common to locate a lawyer for what can only be described as
the appropriate “doctoring” of documents, mainly in order to convey the impression that the purchase was
made prior to 29 March 1978, when such unregulated sales were still legal . . . Even when fraud is
detected, the documents are not always rejected. Often such discrepancies simply provide one more avenue
for bribery.” Williams, supra note 142 at 594.
172
See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 23 at 46-48.

38

of conflicts in Plateau involve Christian farmers and Muslim herders competing for fertile
land. Rising population, increasing heterogeneity, and ineffective government
enforcement combine to raise costs associated with negotiating property rights claims.173
It appears that existing methods for managing conflict have failed: neither customary
norms nor legislative mechanisms are sufficient to stop violent conflict. A close
examination of the customary legal environment and the Land Use Act reveals that a gap
likely exists between the two.174 This gap may help explain why people in Plateau have
turned to violence to solve property-rights disputes.

Evidence indicates that Plateau was settled by many small ethnic groups, who lived in
relative isolation due to the geography of the region and group preference.175 These
groups developed a rich customary law with a wide-ranging set of property rights and
contracting norms that allowed them to trade rights internally and also provided
mechanisms for trading rights with strangers. Evidence indicates that relatively peaceful
trading of property rights predominated and that resort to violence to settle propertyrights claims was limited until fairly recently.176
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The variety of rights in land, and of contracting vehicles, is striking though by no means
uncommon in communal property regimes.177 This variety indicates a rich institutional
response to the problem of internalizing externalities.178 As we have seen, the traditional
communal-property regime has lasted, despite the imposition of legislation by both the
British and post-colonial governments that was designed to change the property-rights
environment. The persistence of this system may be taken as evidence of the importance
of protecting family-based relationships, of providing incentives to cooperate and
coordinate production activities in a useful manner, and of effectively allocating
resources.179 Indigenous dispute resolution -- which was accessible, relatively
inexpensive, and largely transparent -- may also have helped to spread information,
promote cooperation, and lessen conflict within and between ethnic groups.180

There is evidence from Plateau that rights to land existed on a continuum, from
traditional communal property rights to tenure rights that looked very similar to freehold.
Not surprisingly, more extensive rights existed in those areas where investment in land
was high – as was the case, for example, with the Kofyars, who invested heavily in
building terraces and in fertilizing their relatively scarce land.181

The thickness of the property-rights bundle that individuals held under customary law
meant that individuals had increased opportunities to trade these rights and, in turn, to
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benefit from expanded trading opportunities – so long as the rights were enforced. To the
extent that individuals hold thicker, as opposed to thinner, bundles of property rights they
will have increased opportunities to take advantage of dispersed local knowledge, pursue
entrepreneurial opportunities, and gain from trade. A thicker bundle may indicate
additional room to experiment, to try different approaches to solving allocation and use
problems. In their isolated environment, the inhabitants of Plateau seem to have gained
from broad trading of rights to lend, pledge, use, and borrow land.

The richness of the customary legal environment also indicates that the law was relatively
elastic, responding to changing needs over time through an evolutionary process.182
While communal property remained the norm in Plateau state, there was some
movement, over time, towards more individualized tenure over land.183 In a situation
where the demand for land increases, either through changes in population or technology,
one would expect to see a community respond by expending more resources in defining
property rights and in moving from communal ownership toward more individualized
tenure, in the form of sale or, its near-equivalent, unredeemed pledges.184 Such a move
is one way for previously homogeneous communities to deal with the costs of
information asymmetries that arise as the network of contacts and potential trading
partners increase.185 In Plateau, individuals recognized the gains to be had from greater
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specification of property rights.186 These unknown entrepreneurs “created” a new right –
the right to sell property.187 By accommodating this entrepreneurial activity, the
indigenous legal system expanded options for allocating property rights.

Even limited evidence of the existence of land sales indicates that the indigenous legal
system was evolving in response to a changing environment.188 The use of the
unredeemed pledge, for example, provides evidence of a shift toward increased
individualization of tenure, and hence, an evolution of traditional communal-property
norms. A movement towards greater individualization of land-tenure rights will occur
when the marginal benefits of creating and enforcing the rights exceed the marginal costs
associated with the new rights.189

In Plateau, there is evidence that such a process was taking place in mid-20th century. In
the case of the Kofyar people, Netting notes that:

“The Kofyar insist that every square inch of arable soil, both village and bush, has
an owner, a single person to whom the land belongs and who alone may decide on
its use. This is probably a direct outgrowth of intensive farming. Wherever land
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can be made to produce heavily and continuously over a long period of time, it
increases in value to both the occupant and his heirs.”190

With the Kofyar, both factors may have been at work, resulting in a distinctive
institutional response to the issue of land allocation.

Another interesting example of the flexibility of the customary legal environment in
Plateau state – one that promoted homogeneity and its attendant benefits by aligning
property-rights expectations -- was the provision for incorporating, or adopting,
“strangers” into kinship groups.191 The mechanism of allocating property to strangers in
perpetuity was, in essence, a method for inducing homogeneityand thereby managing
problems associated with heterogeneity.192

The process typically began whenever a stranger allied him or herself to a member of the
community and lived with that family, establishing a good reputation.193 T.O. Elias
notes: “The practice has almost always been that strangers would attach themselves to an
influential person with whose family they would normally have been lodging for some
period prior to a formal request being made on their behalf by their host.”194 During this
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period the stranger absorbed the norms and expectations of the adoptive group.195 The
adoptive family monitored this process and also did their best to ensure that the stranger
was trustworthy and otherwise a good “fit” for the group.196 When the adoptive family
was assured this was the case, the head of the family would intercede on the stranger’s
behalf and ask for land (underutilized land had to be available). Presumably, the adoptive
family had its own reputation on the line in such a process and so would monitor
strangers with special care. Once an application for land was made, the chief would
typically consent so long as:
“(1) the stranger should be of good report, (2) he should be ready and willing to
obey the accepted social norms of the adoptive group and (3) he should have
respect for and loyalty to the head chief as well as the elders of the community.
Land granted so granted is held by strangers in perpetuity in exactly the same way
and subject to the like conditions of customary tenure as bind the members of the
owner-occupiers themselves.”197

This process turned a stranger into a quasi-family member and encouraged the adopted
person to align his or her expectations regarding the use and transfer of property with
those of the group.198 One effect was lower transactions costs of group coordination,
cooperation, resource allocation, and use. Another effect was reduced future costs
associated with monitoring and enforcing obligations.
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This mechanism reduced transactions costs associated with dealing with heterogeneous
agents.199 When the ability to engage in impersonal exchange is limited, this mechanism
personalize property-rights trades.200 While the process is costly and slow, itis a step in
the evolutionary process from personal to impersonal exchange. The customary-law
principle for dealing with strangers can thus be seen as a way for outsiders to develop a
reputation for trustworthiness with an unfamiliar group. This feature of the customary
African law, while cumbersome, might have worked to solve the problem of increased
heterogeneity while also managing to ensure better uses of resources that were being
underutilized.201

Preserving relative homogeneity, or inducing homogeneity, might have been an important
strategy for these groups for several reasons. First, groups with higher levels of
homogeneity can coordinate production and other activity in a less costly manner than
can more heterogeneous groups.202 For farmers working with rather primitive, laborintensive technology, low-cost coordination would be valuable.203 More homogeneous
groups are able to cooperate at less cost than are heterogeneous groups.204 Individuals
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within the group are likely to have repeated interactions with other group members. They
may generate higher levels of goodwill and trust each other more.205

Transactions costs incurred by the homogeneous group are low, compared to costs
incurred by heterogeneous groups, because the homogeneous group can more effectively
rely on social norms to promote compliance.206 Higher cooperation levels means that
fewer resources are spent defining, monitoring, and enforcing property rights. In Plateau,
evidence from the 1930s and the 1960s suggests thatviolent conflict over property was
relatively rare.207 Of particular interest is Robert Netting’s observations of the
relationship between the Kofyar and Fulani herdsmen in the 1960s:

The pastoral Fulani did not have access to Plateau pastures until after British
pacification and the eradication of the tsetse fly. Several households now move
up and down the Kofyar escarpment according to the season, and some others
have settled in the lowlands. Their milk products find little market among the
beer-drinking Kofya, but individuals compete in offering money and services to
induce Fulani to camp on and thus manure their fields. With the exception of
venturing freely to new farms on the plain and markets within a twenty-mile
radius, Kofyar show little change in their tolerant relations with neighboring
groups. Few of the strangers in their territory enter into direct competition with
the Kofyar, and those who do, such as the Tiv filtering north from the Benue, are
merely regarded with mild suspicion.208
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As Libecap notes, however, when groups become heterogeneous and have a limited
history of interaction, they may need to turn to more formalized government institutions
to define and enforce these rights.209

The lengthy and costly process for inducing homogeneity through adoption may be
contrasted to the short-term loan, which serves as a means for allowing heterogeneous
individuals limited access to valuable resources. 210 Compared with long-term loans or
sales of real property, the short-term loan might also have lower transactions costs,
particularly when resources are relatively abundant. The reason is that less is at stake.
Parties to a short-term contract, therefore, likely spend fewer resources outlining rights
and obligations. Monitoring costs also are lower (because of the shorter length of the
contract and the fact that the stakes aren’t very high). These lower monitoring costs
mean lower transaction costs. Thus, in cases where problems of heterogeneity cannot
easily be overcome -- such as most trades between animists and Muslims, Christians and
Muslims, or Fulanis and Taroks -- the short-term loan under customary land law is a
cost-effective contracting mechanism for trading property rights and reallocatin g a
resource. 211
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This brings us to the problem of recent conflict in Plateau state. In Plateau, population
size is increasing at the same time that population heterogeneity is increasing.212 A rise
in population size places additional demands on the resource of land, raising its value. At
the same time, increased heterogeneity leads to higher transactions costs when bargaining
for land rights. In the absence of a viable enforcement mechanism, these costs escalate
rapidly. The combination of poorly enforced rights, increasing competition, and the
increasing heterogeneity of actors might lead to fewer property-rights trades and more
violence.213

As we have seen, the customary land law provided two methods for dealing with
heterogeneous actors: a) adoption or b) the short-term loan. Until recently, herders used
the short-term loan of land to acquire rights to graze and water livestock.214 Such loans
presented “no permanent loss of land to the customary owners.”215

These loans

provided benefits to both parties to the transaction: farmers had fields of stubble grazed
and manured; herders had access to grazing grounds not otherwise open to them. The
benefits of the system were such that one commentator says: “In the past 60 to 70 years
relationships between herding and farming groups in the use of land for grazing and
cultivation were generally friendly.”216

As the desert spreads southward, limiting grazing and watering opportunities, herders
from the north are moving into Plateau presumably seeking more permanent rights to
212
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such resources.217 At the same time, as the population of settled farmers increases, there
is an increase in the demand for farmland.218 The two demands clash. Under the
customary law, these heterogeneous parties could turn to the short-term loan to allocate
grazing and watering rights. However, this kind of temporary solution might no longer
be workable if the rising value of property gives short-term lessees incentives to breach
the contract and remain on the land.

In such situations, the customary-law mechanism of “adopting” strangers should come
into play. However, this customary mechanism, which worked effectively to incorporate
small numbers of strangers, might simply be too cumbersome and too slow to incorporate
larger groups of strangers. As a result, we expect to see movement towards increased
individualization of tenure, as the older mechanism proves incapable of managing the
double shock of increasing population and increasing heterogeneity. In other words, we
expect to see the customary law adopt and allow for increased use of the sale of property.

However, this movement is blocked by the Land Use Act. Furthermore, the Act itself
likely promotes tenure insecurity.219 As the value of land increases, people holding
insecure property rights will seek ways to make their rights more secure. Indeed, under
217
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the Land Use Act, herders have a special incentive to assert claims to property because,
under the statute, they may seek rights to as many as 5,000 hectares of land, while
farmers may only seek a maximum of 500 acres.220 Thus herders have an opportunity to
capture a large share of the rents associated with rising property value in the Plateau area.

The Land Use Act might also limit opportunities for cooperative indigenous dispute
resolution. Previous institutional arrangements gave local leaders significant voice in
dispute resolution over property rights. The process created by the LUA allows a much
more limited role for such leaders – that of providing evidentiary material. This role is
surely useful, however, it means that current decision makers are not accountable to the
community in the way that a local leader would be. Also, it is presumably, more difficult
and costly to negotiate or renegotiate land-use rights in the form of certificates of
occupancy with government officials, who have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis
applicants and can thus hold out for bribes. If this the hold- out problem is real, as
Williams argues, then renegotiations in response to changes in the environment are also
more costly and take place less frequently than they would under a customary regime.221

Government will normally provide increased clarification of property rights and
enforcement when property values rise and heterogeneity increases.222 However, if
government attempts to define and enforce rights fail, then people have few options other
than to skirt formal de jure processes. In Plateau, both settled farmers and incoming
herders have insecure property rights under the current amalgamation of customary law
220
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and land-use legislation.223

The value of the land around these groups is rising, so

members of each seek to capture the rents associated with this rise in value, by excluding
members of the other. Corrupt government institutions provide no real alternative for
conflict resolution, and the older customary system might be unable to process this level
of change.224

In such a situation, the cost of resorting to violence might be perceived as

lower than the cost of negotiating a peaceful transfer of property rights.225

By formalizing and centralizing decision-making about land use and land occupancy, the
Nigerian government blocked the continued evolutionary development of customary land
law. The Act replaces indigenous dispute-resolution institutions with bureaucratized,
corrupt government institutions. Rather than rely on decentralized legal decision making,
the Land Use Act creates a formalized and centralized system that is expensive for
individuals to use. This system
, therefore, reduces

experimentation in legal problem

solving, and it leads to decreased jurisdictional competition. The system seems to be
riddled with problems: time-consuming process, costliness, corruption, favoritism, and
inaccessibility for citizens living in rural areas.

Legislation, such as the Land Use Act, might be less elastic and less responsive to
community needs than the customary law because it is removed from individuals who
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hold dispersed local knowledge of each dispute -- i.e., the disputants -- and the potential
impacts of a variety of judgments. By taking land-use decision-making out of the hands
of local leaders – representatives of homogeneous groups – the Land Use Act removes
the incentives members of these groups develop to communicate knowledge, coordinate
activities, and cooperate. The Land Use Act, in effect, promotes the heterogenization of
relations.

The Act blocks the development of a market in land sales, forcing individuals to rely on
government officials to allocate this resource. This blockage limits development of
impersonal exchange, and keeps property/land relations in a state of personal exchange
but importantly, without the enforcement mechanisms that existed under customary law.
Thus, the Land Use Act fails to solve problems associated with heterogeneous agents
while at the same time outlawing sale of land -- the contractual mechanism that is best
suited for managing property-rights relations among such individuals.226

The result is that compared to the customary system, the Land Use Act increases
transaction costs. No longer can individuals and groups rely on social norms to ensure
compliance with property rights. Rather, individuals must rely on the state to define,
monitor, and enforce these rights. Significantly, however, the Nigerian state often fails in
this essential function:
“In light of the pattern of violence in Plateau State over recent months, with each
community seeking to avenge attacks by their opponents, the latest outbreak
should have come as no surprise to federal and state authorities,” said [Peter]
Takirambudde* . . . `Yet the Nigerian government took no action to preempt the
massacre. The government’s neglect of the situation in Plateau over the last three
226
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years has resulted in an endless cycle of revenge,’ Takirambudde said. `Not only
have the police been unwilling or unable to stop the fighting, but the government
has not taken responsibility for finding a lasting solution to the crisis.’”227
*Executive Director, Human Rights Watch’s Africa Division

In Nigeria, the state is considered to be highly corrupt, and state officials often fail to
enforce and protect property rights.228 The judiciary is not considered to be impartial.229
Because the public sector is so corrupt, individuals must rely more heavily on personal
exchange and personal influence to accomplish their goals. Such reliance might be more
difficult in Nigeria because the old customary norms designed to smooth relations among
individuals in dealings over land are superseded by the Land Use Act. No longer are
village headmen, chiefs, or obas able to facilitate the incorporation of outsiders into the
group or make land-use decisions based on their local knowledge. Yet, people do not
have reliable access to government decision makers. Thus, disputes over land allocation
and land use issues may be left to individuals to resolve – and individuals might turn to
violence as their only meaningful method for asserting property claims.

With regard to land, the Land Use Act places primary responsibility for managing the
land-allocation decisions with state governors and, as Transparency International’s 2003
report on Nigeria states: “[A]lthough Nigeria is a federation of states, there has been
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virtually no independent, anti-corruption effort by any of the states or by local
government.”230 This situation bodes especially ill for land issues.

Further, government courts might be less accessible – because they are viewed as corrupt,
costly, and far away -- than customary courts. These government courts might also be
less transparent. These problems are particularly difficult for the poor and less well
educated to manage. In a 2004 report on judicial integrity in Nigeria, the United National
Office on Drugs and Crimes says:
Significant differences were found regarding the experiences and perceptions of
respondents with different socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In
particular the less privileged, both in terms of monetary means and educational
background as well as the ethnic minorities tended to have worse experiences and
perceptions of the justice system . . . Further, the poor and uneducated were
more likely to experience delays in justice delivery . . . women, the poor as well
as ethnic minorities experienced and perceived lower quality of justice delivery .
. . ethnic minorities as well as the poor tended to have less trust in judiciary.231

As individuals face increasing conflict over land, they suffer from a costly system for
resolving disputes over land. Indeed, the system might well be perceived as so costly that
individuals resort to violence in order to lay effective de facto claims to an increasingly
valuable resource – land.232

Conclusion
At first glance the increased violence in Plateau State over property-rights allocations is
puzzling. Why, in the home of “Peace and Tourism,” are thousands of people dying
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because of property disputes? The recognition that changing conditions, both exogenous
and endogenous, create incentives that perhaps lead people to resort to violence rather
than peaceful trade, helps piece this puzzle together. An increasing, and increasingly
heterogeneous, population is demanding access to a scarce resource -- land. This rising
demand raises land values. It is more costly for the citizens of Plateau to come together
peacefully to trade these rights because of the increased transaction costs associated with
greater heterogeneity and because the institutional process for trading rights, created by
the Land Use Act, is also costly. These problems, coupled with tenure insecurity and
poor enforcement of rights might lead to lower levels of peaceful trade and, in turn,
increased violence.

The Land Use Act significantly restricts individual’s abilities to trade property rights in
land. Even if peaceful trade does take place, as it no doubt does, there remains a risk that
such rights might be taken by predatory private or public action. The result is increased
insecurity of tenure. Not only is there increased tenure insecurity in Plateau, there is a
failure of the state government to enforce rights and to manage violence associated with
violations of rights.

The result is that the Land Use Act has blocked legal evolution that would normally
allow for greater individualization of tenure rights in Plateau state. People cannot buy
and sell land in a decentralized market place, they can only legally acquire and transfer
rights through a political process that is deeply corrupted. The result is that as certain
land in Plateau becomes more valuable, because of internal migrations and increasing
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population, citizens face extremely costly process for establishing rights in land. This
paper suggests that these costs might now be so high that people are foregoing the
mechanisms of the Land Use Act, opting instead to take the law into their own hands in
an attempt to establish rights by private force. Unless and until the incentive structure
regarding the transfer of land rights in Plateau (and throughout Nigeria) is changed to
promote peaceful transfer over violence, the problems of Yelwa and Jos are likely to
continue. Nigeria’s leaders should take Robert Cooter’s advice into consideration as
they ponder how to return Plateau to its previously peaceful state:

Central authorities should aim for the modest goals of removing obstacles to
economic opportunity, rather than trying to dictate the pace and direction of
development . . . Uncertainty over property rights can only be removed through
the evolution of customary law and the registration of customary boundaries.233
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